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Prologue 
0 n the gray, chilly morning ofNowmher 12, 1921, Charles Evans Hughe~, the fifty-nine-year-old US. Secretary of State, pre-pmed tu address delegates to the first intern:1tion:ll disarmament 
conference in more than a decade. Hughes hoped th:1t the venue fur the 
Washington Conference, C:ontinentall-bll, the quietly dignitJed building 
dedicated to the heroes of the American Revolution, offered more than a 
cosmetic contrast to the ornate French Foreign Ministry, the scene uf the 
Peace Conference held in P:1ris less than three years earlier. If the disar-
mament umference proceeded as Hughes planned, discussions would rise 
above the stubborn, selfish negotiations of the Paris conference. lie also 
expected participants to move beyond the grand platitudes of earlier dis-
armament conferences. Having insisted that the United States host the 
conference, he intended to pressure delegates representing the major naval 
powers (Cireat Britain, Japan, and the United State~) tu produce positive, 
tangible results that had eluded the world's best statesmen for two decades. 
The distinguished Secretary of State, his full, white hemd immacu-
lately gromned, sat in the center scat uf a lmge U-shapcd table. He was 
flanked, on his right, by the U.S. delegation, which he had handpicked to 
project bipartisanship. It included Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, chair-
man ofthc Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and Oscar Underwood, 
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the Democratic leader of the Senate, as well as Elihu Root, the respected 
former U.S. senator and Secretary of State. On Hughes's left sat Arthur 
James Balfour, the chief of the British delegation. Prince Tokugawa, de-
scendant of the first ruling Shogun, represented Japan's royal family, hut 
Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, the shrewd minister of the navy, was his 
country's chief negotiator. Premier Aristide Briand of France also sat at the 
table, as did government leaders from 1taly, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal. 
The delegations were surrounded hy three hundred journalists, includ-
ing the veteran foreign correspondent Henry Nevinson of the Manchester 
Ciuardian, editors of The Times of London and the Shanghai ~hun Pao, and 
the midwestern sage William Allen White of the Emf)()ria [Kansas] (]a-
zettc. The author H.(}. Wells carried press credentials, as did William Jen-
nings Bryan, the three-time Democratic presidential candidate and former 
Secretary of State. The gallery was filled with dignitaries: Vice President 
Calvin Coolidge, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, Associate Justices 
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Mrs. Warren G. Harding, 
the president's wife, and Alice Longworth, Theodore Roosevelt's daughter. 
Balfour initiated the formal proceedings by making the motion, 
unanimously approved by the delegates, that Hughes serve as permanent 
chairman of the conference. The Secretary of State then rose, briefly ac-
knowledged the applause, and began his speech. He recounted the disap-
pointing history of earlier disarmament conferences, dating hack to the 
1R98 conference convened hy Tsar Nicholas 11 of Russia at The Hague. At 
the outset, Hughes's manner was stiff and impersonal, reminding reporters 
who had covered his losing campaign as the Republican Party's pre,idential 
candidate in 1916 of his tendency to he thorough and excruciatingly dull. 
But when Hughes introduced his disarmament proposal, his voice sud-
denly rose to a dramatic, commanding pitch. "Competition-in armament-
must stop," he said emphatically. Actions, not words, were needed to end 
the competition, he declared, and promised that the United States would 
take the lead. On behalf of the U.S. government, he said, he was autho-
rized to scrap all American warships under construction, including six 
battle cruisers and seven battleships (costing more than $330 million), as 
well as fifteen existing battleships. The total number of capital ships to he 
eliminated comprised an aggregate weight of R45, 7 40 tons. No nation had 
ever made such an offer to reduce its armaments. Hughes paused to let the 
delegates absorb his stunning statement. 
When the excited whispering throughout the conference h~dl sub-
sided, Hughes turned his :mention ro the British :md Japanese delegations, 
demanding that their nations make comparable s:~crifices. For (}rear Brit-
ain, he said, it meant hal ring construction on four enormous "Hoods," the 
Royal Navy's giant new warships, as well :ts rhe destruction of nineteen 
other battleships The British scrap he:tp, he :tddcd, must include l-IMS 
Kirv; George V, rhe battleship viewed most reverentially hy His M:qesty's 
Royal Navy. While Balf\1ur scrihhlcd notes on :m envelope, an astonished 
Lord Beatty, ( 1reat Brit;tin's First Sea Lord, hunched forward in his chair 
and cast a mcn:tcin.~ look :tt the Secretary of Sr:m:. Huglws h:td sunk more 
Rritish warships th:m ":til the :tdmirals ofthc world had destruycd in a cycle 
uf centuries," the ( ;uanlicm's Nevinsun Lttcr wrote. 
Hughes manhandled the );tp:tm·se fleet with equ:d tl.·rv(1r. B:tron 
Kato, who lwd appeared supremely pleased when Hughes de\·astated rhc 
American and British naval :trsen~ds, w:ts chagrined to hear what rhe 
Secretary of St:tte had in mind for his n:tvy. Hughes insisted thar plans 
for eight ]ap:mese warships he ahandoned, an addition:d sew·n h:tttlcships 
and cruisers under construcri(l!1 he scrapped, ami rhat ten okk·r ships he 
destroyed. The toll included the giant Mwsu, the pride of the J:tp:mcse 
Empire. 
"With the :tccepr:mce uf this pLm," Hughes conclttded, "the hur-
den of meeting the dem:mds of competition in naval arm:lllll'Ilt will he 
lifted." As a result, "klnornHHIS sums will he released to ;tid the progress of 
civilization." 
Hughes's idealism w:ts tempered with ;t healthy dose of pr:i.~!ll;tt isn1. 
He well knew that his formula to reduce the world's mmt puwerful n:t-
vies would meet with stiff resistance from Ure:ll Brit<1in and Jap;m. Fur 
the next two and half months, Hughes prc.ssured and cajoled hi.s British 
and Japanese counterparts in puhlic meetings and behind closed do,ns. llc 
did not win every argument. Jap;m refused to destroy rhe Mutsu, t~ll·cing 
Hughes to adjust the requirements fnr the United States and c;re:tt Rritain 
to maintain :t rough tonnage ratio :mwng the three great powers. In early 
Febru;try 1922, Hughes :tnJ1llunced the agrLTI!ll'nt between the three m:tjur 
naval superpowers to dr;t'itictlly rcduCL' their fleets. The intcrnation:tl :tc-
cord was hailed as an historic :tehie\'emenr, and Hughes emerged :ts one of 
the world's leading statesmen. 
* 
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While Hughes received accolades for his disarmament conference tri-
umph, Franklin D. Roosevelt was being fitted with 14-pound braces that 
extended from his heels to above his waist. The braces were the latest and 
harshest acknowledgment that Roosevelt had infantile paralysis and might 
never walk again. Only a year earlier, Roosevelt seemed destined for high 
puhlic office, perhaps the presidency. He was a descendant of one of the 
nation's most illustrious political families. His distant cousin, Theodore 
Roosevelt, had risen in the Republican Party to become president. Though 
Franklin's side of the family were Democrats, he had consciously patterned 
his political career on his cousin. Like Teddy, he had served as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy and campaigned as his party's vice-presidential can-
didate. Though the Democrats' 1920 presidential ticket of Ohio governor 
James Cox and Roosevelt was trounced in the election, Franklin's political 
prospects remained bright. There was immediately talk that the handsome, 
athletic thirty-nine-year-old New Yorker might well head his party's na-
tional ticket in 1924 or 1928. 
Roosevelt's high ambitions appeared to be irredeemably shattered on 
August 10, 1921. That was the day he went to bed with severe chills after a 
vigorous schedule of boating and swimming with his children near the fam-
ily's summer estate on Campobello, a small island off the coast of Maine. 
He thought he had a bad cold, a diagnosis mistakenly confirmed by the 
local family doctor. Two days later, he had lost the ability to move his legs. 
Dr. Robert Lovett, a faculty member at the Harvard Medical School and 
the nation's leading expert on infantile paralysis, was summoned to Cam-
pobello. After Lovett examined Roosevelt, who was paralyzed from the 
waist down, he was certain that his patient had contracted poliomyelitis. 
In September, Roosevelt was transported to New York by private rail-
road car. The New York Times's front-page story informed the public, for 
the first time, that the Democratic Party's rising star had polio and was 
tu he treated at New York's Presbyterian Hospital hy Dr. George Draper, 
Dr. Lovett's protege. At first, Draper assured reporters that Roosevelt would 
walk again. Rut when his patient made no significant progress in the hospi-
tal, Draper hegan to doubt his early prognosis. He worried, moreover, that 
the extent of Roosevelt's debilitating disease might destroy the patient's 
psychological health as well as his hody. 
Only Roosevelt himself possessed absolute confidence that he would 
fully recover. Ry October, when he was discharged from the hospital to 
return to the family's town house on East 65th Street, he could pull him-
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self up by a strap and, with assistance, swing himself into a wheelchair. A 
trained physiotherapist, Mrs. Kathleen Lake, came to the house three days 
a week, laid Roosevelt out on a stiff hoard, and stretched his legs. Franklin 
demanded that she administer the painful exercises every day. Throughout 
his ordeal, Roosevelt maintained his usual ebullience, gaily greeting family 
member and friend alike, often cheering them up. 
A raging battle, meanwhile, was being fought in the family town 
house. Franklin's mother, Sara, had written off any future political career 
for her son and made plans for him to retire to Hyde Park, where she could 
lovingly care for him, as she had done for her elderly husband, James, be-
fore his death. But the imperious Sara faced a formidable challenge from 
Franklin's wife, Eleanor, and his wily and indef~1tigahle political adviser, 
Louis Howe, who had moved into the house to plot Roosevelt's political 
comeback. They aggressively challenged every subtle maneuver by Sara 
to bring Franklin permanently home to Hyde Park. Eleanor supervised 
Franklin's physical recovery, while Howe worked laboriously to preserve 
Roosevelt's political future, sending out a steady stream of press releases 
and maintaining close contact with Democratic leaders across the country. 
Though Roosevelt remained paralyzed from the waist down, Howe con-
tinued to believe that he would be elected president of the United States. 
Charles Evans Hughes's ascent to the nation's highest judicial office was 
predictable, if not preordained. No one was better equipped by training 
and experience to be Chief Justice of the United States. He had been a 
brilliant lawyer, a fearless investigator of corruption in the utilities and in-
surance industries, a progressive Republican governor of New York, and a 
former associate justice of the Supreme Court. In his extraordinary career, 
he had succeeded in almost every challenge he faced. The one exception: 
he narrowly lost the presidency to Woodmw Wilson in 1916. After his suc-
cessful four-year term as Secretary of State, highlighted by the Washington 
Disarmament Conference, he returned to his lucrative private law practice 
in New York City and was elected president of the American Bar Associa-
tion. He also remained active in the Republican Party, campaigning vigor-
ously for Herbert Hoover in 1928 in his successful presidential campaign. 
After Chief Justice Taft died in the winter of 1930, Hoover nominated 
Hughes to be the nation's eleventh Chief Justice. 
Roosevelt's paralysis discouraged virtually any serious thought of fu-
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turc elective office outside of the family's home on East 65th Strl'eL But 
by 1924, Roosevelt had mastered thl' usc of his heavy braces and prepared 
to resume his political career. At the l )emocratic National Convention 
in Madison Squ:1rc Uarden, he moved slowly toward to the podium, lean-
ing heavily on the arm of his strapping sixteen-year-old son James. At the 
podium, RoosevL'It, though perspiring profusely from his exertion, beamed 
at the wildly applauding delegates, and delivered a rousing nominating 
speech for New York governor AI Smith. In confident, dulcet tones, he 
pr:1iscd Smith as the "'Happy Warrior' on the political battlefield." The 
delegates eruptl'd in thunderous applause, a stirring tribute to Roosevelt 
as much as to the man he had nominated. Four years later, Roosevelt was 
elected governor of New York, and, in 19)0, he was reelected by a land-
slide. Howe's political timetable c1lled for Ruosevelt to run for the presi-
dency in 19)6, after Hoover had completed what Howe presumed would 
he his second term. But Hoover's ineffectual response to the nreat Depres-
sion destroyed his presidency and accelerated Howe's schedule. In Novem-
ber 1932, Roosevelt was elected presidl'nt, heating Hoover in the electoral 
college, 472-59. 
Shmtly hefore his presidential inauguration on March 4, 19) 3, Roosevelt 
wrote a cordi:d note to Hughes, recalling their long friendship and ex-
pressing his admir<ltion and respect for the Chief Justice. He asked if he 
might break tradition and recite the entire presidential oath. Hughes read-
ily agreed and wrote that he "especially prized the opportunity of being 
associated with you in our great American enterprise." 
ln his inaugural address, Roosevelt promised "direct, vigorous action" 
to lift the nation out of the disastwus economic depression. Immediately 
upon taking office, he transformed hts pledge of "a new deal fur the Ameri-
can people" into a fusillade of legislative proposals to the Democratically 
controlled Congress. Congress responded hy passing laws that shut down 
insolvent hanks, regulated stock sales, imposed industrial codes, subsidized 
farmers, and put more than a quarter million unemployed young men to 
wmk in the Civilian Conservation C:urps. 
In official Washington, only the U.S. Supreme Court appeared im-
mune to FDR\ contagious spirit. The Hughes Court was anchored by four 
ideological conservatives intractably opposed to Roosevelt's New Deal. 
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The Court's liberal wing was led hy Justice Louis Brandeis, supported hy 
Associate Justices Benjamin Cardozo and Harlan Fiske Stone. 
Chief Justice Hughes and his fellow Hoover appointee, Associate 
Justice Owen Roherts, hdd the balance of judicial power throughuut the 
critical constitutional battles over New De<d legisbtion. By force of his 
commanding intellect and exempbry public service, Hughes was expected 
to lead the Court. But in which direction? He sometimes appeared to split 
the difference between the two warring factions, writing eloquent majority 
opinions protecting civil liberties hut frequently joining the Court's con-
servatives in striking down New Deal statutes. 
Roosevelt publicly derided the Court's anti-New Deal decisions as 
rdics of a bygone "horse-and-buggy" era. His criticism did nothing to deter 
a Court majority that continued to declare one New Deal statute after 
another unconstitutional. Not even his triumphant Llndslide re-election 
appeared to influence the justices. Finally, in frustration and anger in early 
19)7, the president proposed a so-called rcfmm plan that would allow him 
to appoint one new justice f(Jr every sitting justice seventy years of age or 
older. Because six justices were over seventy, including Hughes, the plan 
would have permitted FDR to stack the Court with new appointees favor-
ahle to the New Deal. His radical proposal raised two unsettling consti-
tutional questions: Should a president he <Jbk to mold a Court to meet 
his political goals? And should ideologically driven justices be allowed to 
frustrate the public will? Both questions arc as relevant in the twenty-hrst 
century as they were during the C)rcat Depression. 
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan crcared a dramatic confrontation he-
tween the President and Chief Justice. Roosevelt promoted his plan as 
an effort to bring new energy to an overworked and aging Court. But he 
did a poor joh in disguising his true purpose: to undermine the power uf 
life-tenured justices to thwart his popular mandate. Hughes proved more 
than a match for Rousevelt in defending rhe Court. He deftly rebutted the 
president's claim that the justices were incapable of keeping abreast of the 
Court calendar, and the proposal was resoundingly defeated. In grudging 
admiration of Hughes, Roosevelt later said that the Chief Justice was the 
best politician in the country. That was hardly the way Hughes would have 
chosen to be remembered, though there was much truth in the president's 
remark. 
Shortly after the defeat of his Court-packing plan, Roosevelt made 
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the first of five appointments to the Court in less than three years. All of 
the new justices, from former Senator Hugo Black to Roosevelt's Attorney 
CJeneral, Frank Murphy, were Democrats and loyal New Dealers. Rut with 
each new Roosevelt appointee, Chief Justice Hughes seemed more assured 
in leading the Court. Administration insiders expected the president's third 
appointee, Harvard Law professor Felix Frankfurter, a Roosevelt confidant 
and scathing critic of the Court's anti-New Deal decisions, to challenge 
Hughes for the Court's intellectual leadership. Rut Frankfurter quickly de-
ferred to Hughes and became one of his most avid admirers, ranking him as 
one of the nation's great chief justices. 
Roosevelt was slow to recover from the Court-packing debacle. Em-
boldened conservative Democrats and Republicans blocked the liberal 
president's legislative agenda. Midway through his second term, Roosevelt 
appeared to he a weak, lame-duck president. Rut he never lost his confi-
dence and, like Hughes, never ceded leadership. He outmaneuvered isola-
tionists senators, many of whum had opposed his Court-packing pLm, to 
expedite essential aid to Ureat Britain as the Allies hovered on the brink 
of defeat at the start of the Second World War. 
When Hughes announced his retirement from the Court in June 1941, 
Roosevelt issued a heartfelt letter of regret and invited the Chief Justice 
to lunch at the White House. They talked alone, sharing for the last time 
their common bond of national leadership at a critical point in American 
history. 
